Settlement and Litigation Under Alternative Legal Systems by Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125
SETTLEMENT, LITIGATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF LITIGATION COSTS 
Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde ,�<:i1\1UTE Op 
�� ,.�<:: 
� 
� 
!:f
0 
_, 
t". 
< 
0 
'-' 
"' 
. -< 
-I 
• 
� 
t:;
� 
�
l-1: 
,.....;;:, 
It , .... 
SHALL Ml'\�\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 5:64 
March 1985
ABSTRACT SETTLEMENT, LITIGATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF LITIGATION COSTS 
We consider a situation in which one party (the plaintiff) has a Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde1 
legally admissible claim for damages from another party (the defendant). The 
level of damage is known to the plaintiff; the defendant knows only its 
distribution, which is assumed to be continuous on some range. Before a trial 
takes place, the plaintiff makes a settlement demand. If the defendant 
rejects the demand, the court settles the dispute. We characterize the 
plaintiff's settlement demand policy and the defendant's probability of 
rejection policy for both separating and pooling equilibria. In the 
separating equilibrium, the defendant correctly infers the level of true 
damage from the settlement demand made by the plaintiff. In this case we show 
that, under risk neutrality, • the equilibrium probability of a trial (as a 
function of true damages) is independent of the allocation of litigation 
costs. We also analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium policies 
and compare them for specific litigation cost allocation systems. 
.!.... Introduction 
In recent years a number of papers have appeared which analyze the 
factors that determine whether a dispute between two parties will be litigated 
or settled out of court. This literature dates to work by Landes (1971), 
Gould (1973), Posner (1977) and ultimately Shavell (1982). These authors 
analyzed the economic incentives underlying the process of litigation, but 
never incorporated the strategic aspects of informational asymmetries into 
their models. 
More recently, others have introduced informational asymmetries, and 
the possibility of strategic behavior based upon them, into models of 
litigation in various ways. However, in some cases (Salant and Rest, 1982; 
P'ng, 1983a) the level of settlement is arbitrarily restricted. In others 
(Bebchuk, 1984) it is the uninformed party which moves first (makes a 
settlement offer), so opportunities for strategic information transmission are 
nonexistent. While P'ng (1983b) does allow the informed party to move first 
(after a suit has been filed), it is the defendant who has the private 
information. But the uncertainty in P'ng's model concerns the defendant's 
negligence and thus there are only two potential types of defendant 
(negligent, or not negligent). Salant (1984) considers the obverse of P'ng's 
model, giving the plaintiff both private information and the opportunity to 
make a settlement demand. The uncertainty in Salant•s model concerns the 
1 .  We would like to thank Joel Sobel for helpful discussions. His comments 
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level of damage inflicted on the plaintiff, Since it is natural for this 
variable to take on a range of money values, the problem is much richer than 
that of P'ng (1983b). It is Salant's model to which ours is most closely 
related (in fact, our model is essentially an extension of his to the 
continuum case), and we will comment in more detail on this in the conclusion. 
Suppose that one individual (the defendant) commits an unlawful act 
which harms another individual (the plaintiff), The plaintiff has in 
principle a legally admissible claim for compensation from the defendant, but 
the amount of damage inflicted is known only to the plaintiff. The 
individuals can either agree between themselves to a settlement or they can 
use a third-party dispute resolution mechanism; for example, a court. During 
bargaining, information of a variety of sorts may be exchanged. The plaintiff 
may inflate his or her claims regarding the level of damage and the defendant 
may use discovery rules in an effort to ascertain the level of damage. We 
assume that at the end of this process there is still some residual 
uncertainty on the part of the defendant about the level of true damages; that 
is, the defendant knows only that true damages are confined to some range and 
are distributed according to some frequency distribution. We assume that at 
the conclusion of the bargaining process the plaintiff makes a final 
settlement demand to the defendant. If the defendant rejects the plaintiff's 
final demand, the dispute is settled by the court. Using the court to resolve 
the dispute is costly to both the defendant and the plaintiff (in terms of 
time, legal fees, etc.), and may be subject to error. The court may also 
award the plaintiff punitive damages. The problem is to characterize 
equilibrium policies which specify, for the plaintiff and the defendant, 
respectively, a settlement demand for each possible level of damages, and a 
probability of rejection for each possible level of settlement demand. 
In Section II we present our formal model and describe equilibrium 
policies under quite general assumptions regarding who bears the burden of 
litigation costs. Our definition of equilibrium is based on Kreps and 
Wilson's (1982) sequential equilibrium; it is essentially a signalling 
equilibrium of the type studied by Spence (1974) except that out-of­
equilibrium beliefs are made explicit. We have applied the same equilibrium 
concept to the analysis of tax compliance (Reinganum and Wilde, 1984) using a 
model which has a structure similar to the settlement/litigation model 
introduced in Section II. We focus primarily on separating equilibria, in 
which the defendant can identify the plaintiff's type (the level of damages) 
by the size of the settlement demand he or she makes. We derive closed-form 
characterizations of the settlement demand policy and the probability of 
rejection policy. It is surprising that in the separating equilibrium, even 
though the settlement demand policy and the probability of rejection policy 
depend on the allocation of litigation costs, the likelihood of trial as a 
function of the level of damage (that is, the composition of the settlement 
demand policy and the probability of rejection policy) is independent of the 
allocation of litigation costs. We also show that while the likelihood of 
trial increases with the level of damage and decreases with an increase in 
either party's litigation costs (as expected), it increases with the rate of 
punitive damages and the probability of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 
despite the fact that it is the defendant who decides whether a dispute goes 
to trial. 
In Section III we compare specific allocations of direct litigation 
costs (e.g., legal fees as opposed to time), We consider four systems as 
discussed by Shavell (1982): the American system (in which each party bears 
its own costs), the British system (in which the loser bears all the costs), 
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and systems favoring the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively. Under all 
four of these systems, the settlement demand increases with the level of 
damage, the defendant's litigation costs, the rate of punitive damages and the 
probability of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The settlement demand is 
independent of the plaintiff's litigation coats under the American system and 
the system favoring the plaintiff, and increases with the plaintiff's 
litigation coats under the British system and the system favoring the 
defendant. Under all four systems, the probability of rejection (as a 
function of the settlement demand) increases with the settlement demanded, and 
decreases with an increase in either individual's litigation coats, the rate 
of punitive damages and the probability of a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
We conclude the paper in Section IV, where we summarize our results, 
compare them with those of the existing literature, and discuss interesting 
extensions and variations on the basic model. 
.!I.... The Hodel 
We assume that an individual (the defendant) commits an unlawful act 
which harms another individual (the plaintiff). The amount of damage 
inflicted, d, is known only to the plaintiff. The defendant knows only that 
such damages usually lie within some interval [�.d] and occur with some 
frequency distribution F(. ). If the plaintiff makes a claim which is resolved 
by a court, there is an exogenous probability, 1 - n, that the court will find 
in favor of the defendant. If the court finds in favor of the plaintiff, 
which happens with probability n, it assesses the extent of true damages, d, 
and orders compensation. Thia compensation may include punitive damages. so 
that the judgment awarded the plaintiff is d + td, where t is a measure of the 
extent of punitive damages. The plaintiff has the option to offer to settle 
out of court for an amount S. We allow S to take on any value in ( -•,•) 
although one would expect it to be nonnegative. If the defendant rejects the 
plaintiff's settlement demand, the dispute is resolved by a court or other 
third-party dispute resolution mechanism. 
We assume that both the plaintiff and the defendant are risk-neutral 
wealth maximizers. Let wi, i = P, D represent initial wealth and let ci' i = 
P, D denote litigation costs, for the plaintiff and the defendant, 
respectively. In order to compare alternative systems for allocating 
litigation costs, we define the foll011ing parameters: kij for i, j = D, P 
denotes the litigation costs borne by agent i when agent j wins the case. 
Since the costs cD + cp must be paid, regardless of who wins, it is necessary 
that �D + kPD = kpp + kDP = cD + Cp• Then we can write expected net wealth 
to the plaintiff in the event of a trial as 
Wp - d - + n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kPD" If the plaintiff's settlement 
demand S is accepted, net wealth to the plaintiff is simply wp - d + S • 
Similarly, expected net wealth to the defendant in the event of a trial is 
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wD - n(l + t)d - nkDP - (1 - n)kDD' and if the defendant pays the settlement 
demand S, net wealth is wD - s. We assume that n(l + t)� 2 nkpp + (1 - n)kPD' 
so that a plaintiff is always willing to use the court system, even if damages 
are minimal • 
A strategy for the plaintiff is a function S = s(d), which specifies a 
settlement demand tor each possible level of damages. A strategy for the 
defendant is a function p = p(S) which specifies the probability that the 
defendant rejects the demand s. Because the defendant does not know the true 
damages d, he or she must form some conjectures or beliefs about d based on 
the settlement demand S, Let µC6ls> denote the defendant's assessment that 
d a 6 given that a demand of S was made, where 6 <; [J;!.,dJ. We require that 
µ([g,dJls> = 1; that is, the defendant cannot assign to any demand a type of 
plaintiff which does not exist. Given these beliefs, the expected net wealth 
for the defendant when a demand S is made, and he rejects it with probability 
p, is 
6 
IlD(S,p;µ) = p[WD - n(l + t)Eµ(dls> - nkDP - (1 - n)kDDJ + (1 - p)[wD - SJ, 
where Eµ<dlSl denotes the expected value of damages d, given that S was 
demanded, under the beliefs µ. Net wealth for a plaintiff who has suffered 
damages d, demands S to settle, and takes as given the strategy p(S) of the 
defendant, is 
Ilp(d,S;p) = p(S)[wp - d + n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kPDJ + (1 - p(S))[wp - d +SJ. 
• • • • • Definition 1. A triple (µ ,p ,s ) is an equilibrium if (a) given µ , p (. ) 
• • • • maximizes IlDCS,p;µ ); (b) given p , s (. ) maximizes Ilp(d,S; p ); and (c) if 
s•-1cs> /. d, then µ*<1>ls> = µF(6(\s
•-1csll/µF(s
*-l<s» for all 65;_ l.!!,dJ. 
where µF(6) • IdF(d). 
This definition allows pooling equilibria, in which s*-1csl is set-
valued. We will focus initially on separating equilibria. Therefore we 
define point beliefs d = b(S), which assign a unique type of plaintiff (level 
of damages) to each settlement demand. Then we can rewrite the defendant's 
expected net wealth as 
IlD(S,p;b) = p[WD - n(l + t)b(S) - nkDP - (1 - n)kDD] + (1 - p)[WD - SJ. 
Definition 2.  A triple (b•,p•,s•) is a separating equilibrium if (a) given 
• • • • • • b , p (, ) maximizes IID(S,p; b ); (b) given p , s (, ) maximizes Ilp(d,S; p ); 
. . -
and (c) b (s (d)) = d for all d a [.!!,dl. 
A candidate for equilibrium can be constructed as follows. Consider 
first the decision problem facing the defendant. Clearly IlD is 
differentiable and concave in the defendant's decision variable p.  
Differentiating IlD with respect to p gives 
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ililD/ilp = - n(l + t)b(S) - nkDP - (1 - n)kDD 
+ S. (1) 
This expression is independent of p; if it is positive, p*<s> = 1; if it is 
negative, p*<s> = O; if it is zero, then the defendant is indifferent about 
the value of p*(s). Consider initially an interior equilibrium, in which 
• • p (S) B ( 0,1). Then s (d) must satisfy anD/ilp = 0, which, after 
incorporating the consistency condition that b•(S) = d, yields 
• s (d) = n(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD. (2) 
However, the settlement demand function s•(d) must also maximize the 
plaintiff's expected profit, given p*<s>. If p*<s> is twice differentiable, 
then s•(d) must solve 
• • ililp/ilS = p '(S)[n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kPD - S] + 1 - p (S) 
and satisfy the second-order necessary condition 
0, (3) 
a2np/as
2 
= p•"(S)[n(l + tld - nkPP - (1 - n)kPD - Sl - 2p
*•cs> � o. (4) 
Combining equations (2) and (3), and recalling that �D + kPD 
kpp + kDP = cD + cp• yields a first-order linear differential equation which 
• 
p (S) must satisfy. 
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-p'(S) - p(S)/(cp + CD) - 1/(cp + CD) = 0 ( 5) 
Equation (5) has a one-parameter family of solutions 
p(S) = 1 + a  exp(-S/<cp + cD)}. As is shown in the Appendix, the appropriate 
• 
boundary condition is p(£) = 0, where £ = s <&> = n(l + t>& + nkDP 
+ (1 - n)kDD is the settlement which would be demanded by the least-damaged 
plaintiff. This yields the probability of rejection function 
p(S) = 1 - exp{-(S - £>/<cp + CD)}. 
We also need to specify beliefs about settlement demands outside the 
- - * - -range [£,S], where S = s (d) = n(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD' Although we 
will argue that virtually any out-of-equilibrium beliefs are permissible, we 
find the following beliefs both simple and compelling: if S < �. let b*(S) = & 
and if S . 
-
S, let b (S) = d. That is, when a demand is made which ought not 
to be made by any plaintiff in equilibrium, the defendant believes the 
plaintiff to be that plaintiff whose equilibrium demand is closest to the one 
which was made. 
Theorem 1. The following triple (b*,p*,s*> is the "unique" separating 
equilibrium: define £ = n(l + t)g + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD and 
- -
S = n(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD' 
r * 1 - exp{-(S - £)/(cp + cD)} (i) p (S) = 0 
• 
s ) s 
Se [�.SJ; 
s s. £ 
(ii) s (d) = n(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD' for d e [g,dJ; 
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Ciiil b*<s> 
{ :' - '"nP - (> - "'"nnl/•<> • t) 
s s. � 
s 2 s 
s 8 rn. sJ 
The word "unique" is flagged in Theorem 1 for the following reason. 
It is clear that we could allow arbitrary beliefs for demands outside the 
interval [£,SJ, since any beliefsµ would have an expected value EµCd !S) 
between & and d. Demands S < � would be accepted with probability 1 under the 
belief that b(S) = g, and would be even more attractive to the defendant if he 
or she believed that the expected damages were greater than g. Similarly, 
demands S > S will be rejected with probability 1 under the belief that 
b(S) = d, and would be even less attractive if expected damages were believed 
to be smaller. Thus there is actually a unique "equivalence class" of 
separating equilibria, in which out-of-equilibrium beliefs may differ, but the 
• * policies p (. ) and s (. ) are the same. 
The equilibrium strategies are displayed in Figure 1. The proof of 
Theorem 1 is tedious and can be found in the Appendix. However, an intuitive 
justification of the boundary condition p*(£) = O is as follows. The policy 
• 
p (S) must be increasing; since the settlement demand function reveals true 
damages d, larger settlement demands are less attractive to the defendant. 
• 
Thus any discontinuities in p (. ) must consist of upward jumps. But an upward 
- .
jump at any demand S s [£,SJ implies that the plaintiff d for whom s (d) = S 
would strictly prefer to demand S - s for sufficiently small e. The upward 
* -jump in p (. ) at S is permissible because in equilibrium there are no 
. -
plaintiffs for whom s (d) > S, and consequently no plaintiffs are tempted to 
deviate from their equilibrium demands. 
The equilibrium strategies will obviously depend upon the allocation 
of litigation costs, and this dependence is examined in Section III for 
several specific cost allocation systems. However, ultimately we want to 
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compare the equilibrium probability of trial ( for any given level of damages 
d) under alternative legal systems. The equilibrium probability of trial as a 
= p*<s*(d)). The simple way in which p* 
A 
function of the damages d is p(d) 
depends on S and the linearity of s* in d combine to give 
A 
p(d) = 1 - exp{-n(l + t)(d - gJ /<cp + cD)}. (6) 
Corollary 1. The equilibrium probability of trial is independent of the 
allocation of litigation costs. 
This surprising result contrasts sharply with those of Shavell (1982), 
P'ng (1983b) and Bebchuk (1984), all of whom conclude that when both plaintiff 
and defendant are risk-neutral the allocation of litigation costs materially 
influences the equilibrium probability of trial. Other properties of �(d) 
will be described in Section III. 
Besides the separating equilibrium described in Theorem 1, there may 
exist a continuum of pooling equilibria. Most depend upon "perverse" out-of-
equilibrium beliefs; these are characterized in the Appendix. But one pooling 
equilibrium deserves some discussion: suppose that d - E(d) � 
(cD + cp>/n(l + t), where E(d) is the expected value of d before any 
settlement demand is made (the prior or unconditional mean of d). If the 
defendant believes that the settlement demand contains no information (that 
is, the beliefs µ are such that E Cd lS> = E(d) for all S), then the µ 
equilibrium settlement demand policy is 
. -
s (d) = n(l + t)E(d) + n�P + (1 - n)kDD for all de [g,d], and the 
equilibrium rejection policy has p*(s) = O for 
• 
S i n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD and p CS) 1 for 
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S > n(l + t)E(d) + nDP + (1 - n)kDD" In this case the defendant simply 
ignores any information which might be contained in the settlement demand; all 
plaintiffs are treated as if they suffered average damages. The condition 
d - E(d) i (cD + cpl/n(l + t) guarantees that all plaintiff types would prefer 
such a settlement to trial, and that the defendant will accede to such a 
settlement demand but will reject any larger demand. 
III. Alternative Legal Systems 
Shavell (1982l discusses four alternative allocations of litigation 
costs: (1) the American system, in which each party bears his or her own 
costs (kDD = kDP = cD and kpp = kPD = cpl; (2l the British system, in which 
the loser bears all the costs (kDD = kpp = 0 and �P = kPD = cD + cpl; (3) the 
system favoring the defendant, in which the defendant bears his or her own 
costs if the plaintiff wins, but the plaintiff bears all costs if the 
defendant wins (kDD = 0, kDP = cD' kpp = cp• and kPD = cD + cpl; and (4l the 
system favoring the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff bears his or her own 
costs if the defendant wins, but the defendant bears all costs if the 
plaintiff wins (kDD = CD' �p = CD+ Cp• kpp = o. and kPD = cpl· 
Denote the dependence of the equilibrium strategies and beliefs upon 
the legal system by a subscript i = A,B,P or D (American, British, favoring 
• • • 
the plaintiff, or favoring the defendant): pi(Sl, si(dl, bi(Sl, �i' Si. 
It is straightforward to show that the following comparative statics 
results hold for allocation systems (ll-C4l above. For Sa [�i.Si]' the 
equilibrium probability of rejection is an increasing function of the 
• settlement demand S; since pi'(Sl > O, the defendant is more willing to go to 
• 
trial the greater is the plaintiff's settlement demand. Note that pi also 
depends on n. t, cD and cp through �. Differentiation with respect to the 
1 2  
• • 
litigation cost parameters implies that api/acp < o and api/acD < O; that is, 
the defendant is more willing to settle the greater are the plaintiff's or his 
own litigation costs. Moreover, an increase in either the probability of 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff or punitive damages results in an increased 
• • willingness to settle; that is, api/at < o and api/an < o. 
• The equilibrium settlement demand policy si(d) is increasing in d; 
that is, plaintiffs with greater damages demand greater settlements. 
Increases in cD' n and t also result in an increased settlement demand, while 
• 
si(d) increases with cp under the British system and the system favoring the 
plaintiff, and is independent of cp under the American system and the system 
favoring the defendant. Thus larger litigation costs for the defendant, an 
increase in the probability of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and a 
greater potential award from trial result in greater settlement demands. 
However, the plaintiff's own litigation costs do not affect the settlement 
demand function under some allocation systems. 
Concerning the equilibrium probability of trial as a function of 
A 
damages, note that p'(d) > O; that is, cases involving greater damage are more 
likely to go to trial. An increase in litigation costs for either the 
plaintiff or the defendant results in a lower equilibrium likelihood of trial. 
However, an increase in either the probability of a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff or the rate of punitive damages makes trial more likely. These 
latter results are reversed from the effects of n and t upon p*Cs), the 
equilibrium probability of trial as a function of the settlement demand, and 
are initially counter-intuitive. They stem from the equilibrium interaction 
between the settlement demand policy and the probability of rejection policy. 
The direct effect of an increase in the expected benefit of a trial to the 
plaintiff is to make the defendant less willing to go to trial (since the 
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plaintiff's expected benefit i s  largely a transfer from the defendant). But 
it also causes the plaintiff to inflate his or her settlement demand, which 
has the indirect effect of increasing the likelihood that the demand is 
rejected. On net, the indirect effect dominates � even though a trial is 
less attractive to the defendant, the increased settlement demand forces the 
dispute into the courts more often. 
The following proposition compares the equilibrium policies under 
these four alternative legal systems • 
Corollary 2. The settlement demand policy is greatest under the system 
favoring the plaintiff, and lowest under the system favoring the defendant. 
The settlement demand policy under the American system is above, is equal to, 
or is below that under the British system as n is below, is equal to, or is 
above cD/CcD + cP)' Formally, 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
• • • 
Sp(d) > SA(d) > SD(d) for all d; 
• • 
Sp(d) ) SB(d) 
• 
sD(d) for all d; 
> < 
• • sA(d) = sB(d) for all d as n = cD/(cD + cpl• 
This result allows us to compare the equilibrium probability of 
rejection functions as well. 
Corollary 3 .  The probability that a given settlement demand i s  rejected is 
greatest under the system favoring the defendant and lowest under the system 
favoring the plaintiff. This probability is smaller than, the same, or 
greater under the American system as compared to the British system as n is 
smaller. equal to. or greater than cn/ <cD + cp>• Formally, 
14 15 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
* * * Pp(S) � pA(S) � p0(S) for all S; 
• • * Pp(S) � pB(S) � Pn(S) for all S; 
.. .. pA(S) = p8(S) for all s as n = c0/cc0 + cp>· 
Inequalities (i), (ii) and (iii) (for n � c0/(c0 + cpl> are strict except at 
values of S at which the policies being compared are both equal to O or 1. 
IV. Conclusion 
The results of this paper fall into two categories. The first deals 
with the characterization of equilibrium settlement demand and probability of 
rejection policies. The model we develop and the results we obtain in this 
regard are closely related to those of Salant (1984). In fact, the basic 
problem is exactly the same as his except that we assume a continuum of 
plaintiff types while he assumes finitely many. The advantage of using a 
continuum of types is that we are able to obtain closed-form characterizations 
of the equilibrium strategies, whereas Salant obtains rather complex, 
recursive characterizations which are relatively hard to interpret. The other 
advantage of our approach is that we introduce out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
explicitly. This is especially useful in eliminating various equilibria that 
depend on perverse expectations (see, for example, the discussion of pooling 
equilibria in the Appendix and compare it to Salant's footnote 12). The 
closed-form characterizations also make comparative statics easier and allow 
us to compare alternative systems for the allocation of direct litigation 
costs. This comparison gives us our second category of results. 
It is surprising that when one considers the probability of using the 
court (or any third-party dispute resolution mechanism) as a function of 
damages, the allocation of direct litigation costs is irrelevant. Although 
this result is likely to be sensitive to our assumption of risk neutrality, it 
contrasts sharply with that of Shavell (1982), who (under the same assumption) 
concludes that the allocation of litigation costs materially influences the 
likelihood of trial. The difference in results stems largely from Shavell's 
additional assumption that a dispute will be settled outside the court 
whenever there exists a settlement amount which makes both parties better off 
than going to trial. When the settlement process is made endogenous and the 
defendant is allowed to use the settlement demand to infer information about 
the plaintiff, the outcome is dramatically changed, 
Other authors have considered the effect of different allocations of 
litigation costs on the likelihood of trial; in particular, both P'ng (1983b) 
and Bebchuk (1984) find that a shift from the American to the British system 
for allocating litigation costs increases the likelihood of trial. However, 
the results of P'ng and Bebchuk are less directly comparable to ours than 
those of Shavell since, as we indicated in the introduction, they model the 
settlement and litigation problem quite differently than we do. 
We also find that some comparative statics of the equilibrium 
A 
probability of trial p(d) are reversed from the partial-equilibrium 
comparative statics of the equilibrium strategy p*<s>. In both cases 
increases in direct litigation costs reduce the probability of using the 
court. However, an increase in the expected return to the plaintiff from 
using the court decreases the equilibrium strategy p*(s), but increases the 
A 
probability p(d) that the court will be used, even though it is the defendant 
who ultimately makes that decision. 
Other variations and applications of this model may be of interest. 
For example, if one assumes the parties are risk averse, the allocation of 
16 
litigation costs might well influence the equilibrium likelihood of trial. An 
analysis of this case might provide the basis for a welfare comparison of 
alternative systems. The pre-trial bargaining process could also be 
generalized. In this paper, as well as the existing literature, one party is 
given the right to make a final settlement demand, and, inevitably, this 
settlement demand is such that the other party is indifferent to settling out 
of court or going to trial. A more sophisticated and realistic specification 
of the bargaining process seems a minimal prerequisite for an analysis of 
juridical policy issues. In terms of other applications, one could also use 
this methodology to analyze breach of contract disputes when the level of 
losses to the breached party is uncertain. The latter can demand a settlement 
from the breaching party or use the court. This will affect both parties' 
incentives in a way that has not been taken into account in the existing 
literature. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1.
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part. we show that 
(b*, p*, s*> is a separating equilibrium. In the second part, we argue that 
(modulo out-of-equilibrium beliefs) it is the only separating equilibrium. 
Part I ( Equilibrium) The proof consists of three steps. We show that (1) 
• • • • • given b (S), p (S) maximizes IID(S,p; b ); (2) given p (S), s (d) maximizes 
. . . -Ilp(d,S; p ); and (3) b (s (d)) = d for all de [ g, dJ. It should be apparent 
17 
from the proof that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified in Theorem 1 are 
not crucial to the argument. 
- . Step (1). For Sa [�,SJ, b (S) (S - n�P - (1 - nlknn>/n(l + t). Thus 
• 
IID(S, p; b ) 
• 
p [ WD - n(l + t)b (S) - n�p - (1 - n)kDDJ + (1 - p) [ WD - SJ 
= wD - S, independent of p.
. -Consequently, p (S) as described in Theorem 1 is optimal for S a [�,SJ 
(although not uniquely so). 
- . -
For S > S, b (S) = d, so 
• 
IID(S, p; b ) = p [ wD - n(l + t)d - nkDP - (1 - n)kDDJ + (1 - p) [ wD - SJ. 
- . 
Since wD - n(l + t)d - nkDP - (1 - n)kDD ) wD - S if S ) S, P (S) = 1 is 
optimal for S > s.
• 
Finally, for S < � .  b (S) = g, and 
• 
IIDCS,p; b l p [ WD - n(l + t)g - n�p - (1 - n)kDDJ + (1 - p) [ wD - SJ. 
• Since WD - n(l + t)& - nkDP - (1 - n)kDD < wD - S for S < � .  p (S) 
optimal for S < �. 
Step (2), Recall that 
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O is 
• • • Ilp(d,S; p ) = p (S) [ wp - d + n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kpnl + (1 - p (S)) [ wp - d + SJ. 
- - . . Demands S > S are dominated by S, since Ilp(d,S; p  )- Ilp(d,S; p ) 
. - - -
(1 - p (S)) [n(l + t)(d - d) + cD + cpl > O for S > S. Moreover, demands of 
• S < � are dominated by � .  since IIP(d,S; p ) = wp - d + S for S � �. Thus for 
- . - . 
any de C&,dl, it follows that s (d) e [�,S]. For S in this interval, p (S) 
is twice differentiable, with p*• c s> = eg(S)/Ccp + en> and 
p*••(S) = -eg(S) /Ccp + cD)
2, where g(S) = -(S - �>/<cp + en>· Differentiating 
• IIP(d,S; p ) with respect to S and equating to zero gives 
or S 
• * a Ti p/as = p '(S) [n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kPD - S] + 1 - p (S) 
eg(S) [n(l + t)d - nkDP - (1 - rr)kDD - S]/(cp + CD) 
• 
s (d) = n(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - n)knn· Since 
2 * • 2 s•(d)) Cl Ilp(d,s (d); p )/as = -e
g( /(op + CD) ( 0, 
0, 
* S = s (d) provides a local maximum for IIP. But since this is the only 
stationary point of II P on [� .SJ, it must also (uniquely) provide the global 
maximum. 
Step (3), * • Clearly b (s (d)) = d for all d e rn, d], 
Part II (Uniqueness) 
To see that no other separating equilibrium exists (modulo out-of-
equilibrium beliefs see the discussion immediately following Theorem 1), 
first note that s•(.) must be monotone increasing. If it were not monotone, 
it would not separate types; if it were monotone decreasing, then optimally 
p*(. ) must be non-decreasing since s*(.) signals true damages d, lower 
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settlement demands are always more attractive to the defendant. But if p*(.) 
is non-decreasing, then s*(.) decreasing cannot be optimal for the plaintiff 
because as d rises the payoff from trial rises, while the settlement demand 
s*(d) falls and is at least as likely to be met. Thus s*<. J must be monotone 
. -· increasing; let � and s denote the lowest and highest demands made under 
s*(d) • 
The fact that s•(.) is increasing implies that p*(.) must also be 
. -· . monotone increasing on [� ,s ], except where p (S) 1. To see this, first 
. -· 
suppose there exist s1 and s2 in [� ,s ] with s1 < s2, such that 
• • • p CS1J = p CS2) < 1. Then the type d1 for whom s Cd1) = s1 would strictly 
* prefer to demand s2. Next suppose that p (.) were monotone decreasing on some 
* -· • interval cs1,s2J in [� ,s ]. Then all types d with s (d) a [S1,s2) would 
. . -· strictly prefer to demand s2. Thus p (S) is monotone increasing on [� ,s l 
A-• '* 
except possibly for a flat portion on an interval [S,s 1 where p (S) = 1. 
$ * A This means that p (S) £ (0,1) fo� all Se (� ,S). 
* * A By equation (1), p (S) s (0,1) for all S s (� ,S) implies that 
s*(d) • rr(l + t)d + nkDP + (1 - rr)kDD' so� =� as defined in Theorem 1. 
Since expected damages are (at least) & when a demand below � is made, 
* • aIID/ap < O, so that p (S) = 0 for all demands S < �. Next note that p (S) 
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_. 
must be continuous from below for S a [�. s J, for any jump must be upward, and 
• an upward jump at, say, s1 would cause type d1 such that s Cd1) = s1 to 
strictly prefer a report of s1 - a for sufficiently small a. In particular, 
this argument implies that p·(�) = o. Continuity of p*(s) implies that p*Cs> 
-
· is differentiable almost everywhere on [�,s J. 
If p*Cs> is differentiable at S a [� .�J. then equations (2) and (3) 
A 
must both hold; hence (5) must hold almost everywhere on [� .SJ. Then for S in 
• • this interval, p (S) = 1 + a  exp{-S/(cD + cp)J, where the continuity of p (. ) 
across any possible points of non-differentiability ensures that the same 
* A constant a applies; that is, p (S) is differentiable on [�.SJ (where left- and 
A 
right-hand derivatives are used at � and S, respectively). 
We have already argued that the boundary condition p*(�) = 0 is 
* A -• necessary, so p (S) = 1 - exp{-(S - �>/Ccn + cp>J. Thus there is no Sis at 
. -· 
-
which p (S) = 1; hence s =S as described in Theorem 1. Any demand S > S has 
associated with it expected damages of (no greater than) d, so ann/ap > 0, 
. - . implying p (S) = 1 for all S > s . This upward jump in p (.), which occurs 
just after S, is permissible in equilibrium because (in equilibrium) no 
plaintiff demands S > S; thus there are no plaintiffs who would be tempted by 
this jump to demand less. 
Pooling Equilibria 
Suppose all plaintiffs settle at some s•. Then it must be the case 
. -
that n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD 2 S 2 n(l + t)d - nkpp - (1 - n)kPD; 
that is, the defendant must prefer s• to trial and all plaintiff types (in 
particular, the one with the highest damage level) must also prefer s• to 
. -
trial. Such an S exists if and only if d - E(d) i (cD + cp>/n(l + t). The 
problem is to find out-of-equilibrium beliefs, E (d ( S) for S # s•, which µ 
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• support this as an equilibrium. Since S 2 n(l + t)E(d) + nknP + (1 - n)kDD' 
• • we can set p(S ) = O. Then regardless of Eµ(d ( S) for S < S , no plaintiff 
• will ever demand a settlement less than S • In particular, if Eµ(d ( S) = E(d) 
for s < s•, then p*<s> = o for s < s• is optimal for the defendant and s• will 
dominate any s < s• for the plaintiffs. 
The situation for S > s• is more complicated. For a plaintiff of type 
• • • d, S will dominate any S > S if and only if p (S) 
• > (S - S >/CS - n(l + t)d + nkpp + (1 - n)kPDJ. This constraint is feasible 
since by the definition of s•, the right-hand side is less than 1. But the 
defendant will be willing to set p*<s> > o for s > s• if and only if 
Eµ<dls> i cs - nkDP - (1 - n)knn>/ nCl + t). 
• 
• 
If Eµ(d ( S) = E(d) for all s > s • 
then this constraint will hold for all S > S if and only if 
E(d) i cs* - nkDP - (1 - n)knn>/n(l + t), or 
• n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD i S • But we require 
• • n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD 2 S in the definition of S • So in this 
• • case, the only possible value for S is S = n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)knn· 
In this case, for any S > s *, p*cs> = 1, so it will indeed support an 
• equilibrium. If S < n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)kDD' pooling equilibria are 
still possible so long as Eµ(d ( S) i (S - nkDP - (1 - n)knn>/n(l + t). But for 
S "close" to s• this requires E (d ( S) < E(d); in other words, if the defendant µ 
sees a settlement demand greater than s• but not too high, he or she must 
believe this came from a plaintiff type with true damages less than the 
average. These " perverse" beliefs are possible but unlikely, so the most 
natural pooling equilibrium is the one in which E (d ( S) = E(d) and µ 
• S = n(l + t)E(d) + nkDP + (1 - n)knn· Recent work by Banks and Sobel (1985) 
suggests that pure pooling equilibria which rely on such "perverse" beliefs 
fail to satisfy a desirable stability condition. 
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